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In The National Security Constitution,I Professor Harold Hongju Koh
uses the Iran-Contra affair as a vehicle for examining the adequacy of the
constitutional framework for making national security policy. He first
argues that the various investigators of the affair failed to identify the
appropriate historical antecedent for their work. The more appropriate
precedent, in his view, was the Vietnam War in that, in both instances,
the executive branch arrogated constitutional power at the expense of the
Congress in pursuit of an illegitimate foreign policy. Koh particularly
faults the Iran-Contra congressional investigation for its prosecutorial fo-
cus, modeled after the Watergate hearings. According to Koh, the prob-
lem in the Iran-Contra affair was not that misguided officials violated the
law, as the Tower Commission and congressional committees concluded,
but rather that the basic institutional structure of government failed. He
finds particularly alarming the tendency of executive branch representa-
tives, such as Colonel Oliver North, to clain unbounded constitutional
power, a claim he sees as frustrating the proper role of Congress. To
meet this assault on the "National Security Constitution," Koh recom-
mends new legislation designed to force a more active participation in
foreign-policy making by Congress and the courts.
The theme is familiar, but Koh's analysis joins Michael J. Glennon's
Constitutional Diplomacy 2 in presenting the most scholarly and sophisti-
cated exegesis of the topic to appear in recent years. 3 Drawing on an
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
: Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law.
1. H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECuRrrY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFtER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. M. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990).
3. The classic text is L. HFNKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
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impressive array of constitutional law and political science, Koh shows
how the law of foreign affairs is based on an eclectic mixture of constitu-
tional text and structure, historical practice, treaty commitments, legisl.a-
tion and executive orders, in addition to the traditional nuggets of
wisdom from the "Founding Fathers" and dictum selected from sporadic
judicial decisions.
Koh's rich exposition of the legal culture, however, is incomplete in
one important respect. He does not sufficiently explore the implications
of congressional acquiescence in a process that has yielded not only Viet-
nam and Iran-Contra, but also most of the other "abuses" of executive
power that the critics cite.4 The cultural and political forces affecting
congressional and judicial behavior in this field virtually assure the exec-
utive hegemony that Koh decries. Indeed, the accretions of Presidential
power that Koh condemns are for the most part acceptable to Congress
and the American public. Both want Presidential leadership, which re-
quires correlative Presidential power. The initial reaction to President
Bush's foreign policy illustrates my thesis. President Bush has systemati-
cally asserted broad claims of constitutional authority in foreign affairs, 5
and yet he has been criticized for not acting quickly and boldly enough,
whether in invading Panama, deposing Noriega, or in responding to
events in Eastern Europe. In this political environment Koh's prescrip-
tions for reform seem unlikely to be accepted by the institutions he wants
to engage. Finally, and most fundamentally, Koh does not address the
question of why it would be better for legislators and judges to have more
of an impact on U.S. foreign policy.
I. The Botched Investigation
Koh argues that, from the start, the Iran-Contra investigators misun-
derstood the problems confronting them. They assumed they were deal-
ing with a potential Watergate while, in fact, they had just slumbered
through another Vietnam. By misunderstanding the nature of the situa-
tion, they chose inappropriate models, roles and investigative ap-
proaches. Koh points out that the congressional committees
investigating the affair chose to play the dual role of prosecutor and
judge in a morality play rather than concentrating on the constitutional
issues and the need for legislative reforms. The committees used prose-
4. See Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1989);
Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1461
(1989).
5. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1990 and 1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PaEs. Doc. 266 (Feb. 16, 1990).
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cutors rather than foreign affairs law experts, and were too large and
unwieldy to sustain a coherent focus of analysis. As Koh writes: "[A]t
times all twenty-six members and three different sets of staff counsel
questioned a single witness .... The televising of the hearings greatly
enhanced the opportunity for individual members to engage in grand-
standing and 'credit-claiming.'" 6
Koh considers the format of the process to be part of the problem
while a politician might consider it to be the point of the exercise. By
modeling the process on Watergate, the politicians no doubt hoped to
gain comparable public stature for their efforts. It is true that the Iran-
Contra affair raised separation of powers issues, as did the end of the
Vietnam War, but it is not surprising that Congress did not find the mod-
els of that time either applicable or appealing. The early Vietnam hear-
ings had an impact because they resonated with and reinforced a broad
public opposition to the war. No similar opposition developed to the
Reagan Administration's efforts to release the hostages or to improve
relations with Iran. The foreign policy implicated in Iran-Contra, unlike
the Vietnam War, was not deeply unpopular. Moreover, the American
public, along with Congress, was sharply and almost evenly divided over
support for the Nicaraguan Contras. In addition, when the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee held hearings on the causes of the Vietnam
War,7 little attention was paid to them by the American public.
Although the Foreign Relations Committee brought before it an impres-
sive parade of witnesses, the press and public ignored the hearings and,
consequently, so did the Senators. Members of Congress pay attention to
the public, and the public is not much interested in history lessons or
constitutional theory. Congress did not miss the point when setting up
its Iran-Contra investigation; it only misjudged the viability of the affair
as a policy failure and the vulnerability of the Chief Executive as a
culprit.
II. The Assault on the National Security Constitution
In the course of the, hearings and subsequent litigation, executive
branch proponents and their lawyers no doubt made extreme claims re-
garding Presidential power in foreign affairs. To constitute a true assault
on the Constitution, however, their claims must be backed by deeds.8 It
is not enough to assert, or to deny the assertion, that the President has
6. P. 18.
7. Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 9-11, 1972).
8. See M. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 2, at 54-65.
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the authority to make foreign policy and can therefore use any resource
of the government to that end, whether sending armies abroad or con-
ducting covert operations. Words alone do not amount to law. One must
instead look at the particular action, in the particular context, and deter-
mine what principles or rules emerge from the "case." Since there are
very few judicial cases, most "case law" in this area must be extracted
from the often inarticulate actions of the House, the Senate and the
Executive.
Koh recognizes the importance of historical practice and unconven-
tional sources in giving shape and substance to the constitutional law in
this area:
[Ultimate judgments regarding how the Constitution allocates particular
powers in foreign affairs cannot be reached solely by looking at constitu-
tional text, for the problem is not simply one "of correctly discerning or
stating the legitimate bounds of the presidential and congressional powers
respectively." Rather, allocations of authority must be identified by "rea-
soning from the totalstructure which the text has created." Accordinglyat
this first level, the core principles of the National Security Constitution
must be ascertained not only through textual exegesis of particular constitu-
tional clauses, but also through inferences drawn from the broader struc-
ture and relationships created by the Constitution...
The historical examination of constitutional structure and relationship that
follows suggests that our National Security Constitution rests upon a simple
notion: that generally speaking, the foreign affairs power of the United
States is a power shared among the three branches of the national govern-
ment...
At a second, subordinate hierarchical level, more specific rules governing
the legal rights and duties of the three branches in national security decision
making can be found in 'framework statutes": laws that Congress enacts
and the president signs within their zone of concurrent authority, not sim-
ply to "formulate policies and procedures for the resolution of specific
problems, but rather.., to implement constitutional policies." Such legisla-
tion ... reinforces and elaborates the constitutional foundation of power
sharing by constructing a statutory superstructure that declares in greater
detail how power should be distributed among institutions in specific areas
of foreign policy...
At the third and lowest level in this legal hierarchy stands a body of histori-
cal precedent that may be thought of as quasi-constitutional custom. This
term embraces a set of institutional norms generated by the historical inter-
action of two or more federal branches with one another: executive practice
of which Congress has approved or in which it has acquiesced, formal and




complied, and certain vacated judicial opinions that have acted as influen-
tial advisory opinions to the other two branches.9
Since World War II, the National Security Constitution can be found in
the web of Presidential proclamations, treaty commitments, legislation
and executive orders. In addition, Congress has regularly authorized and
appropriated funds for a defense, foreign, policy and intelligence bureau-
cracy appropriate to a superpower.
Koh's book provides a thorough guide to this evolving national secur-
ity structure. He calls particular attention to "framework statutes," like
the National Security Act of 1947,10 that established broad outlines of
authority, and to the post-Vietnam and Watergate legislative reforms
that instituted a network of "reporting and consultation requirements
[that] have now attained quasi-constitutional status."11 This framework
legislation provides detail and structure for the allocation of decision-
making authority. The framework itself, however, turns out to be rather
pliable and unstable. Koh states that the President has often construed
legislation designed to constrain his action as authorizing additional
Presidential powers. "[T]he President has won because, for all of its in-
stitutional activity, Congress has usually complied with or acquiesced in
what the President has done, through legislative myopia, inadequate
drafting, ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will."12
Koh marshals arguments against this result, but he does not ade-
quately explore the most important of his assigned reasons, the "lack of
political will." In my view Congress' lack of political will explains the
unsatisfactory (for Koh) state of constitutional law in foreign affairs.
However, I would eschew his pejorative description of the term as imply-
ing congressional weakness. To me Congress is enormously strong, not
weak, and Congress is wise enough to recognize that it is not in the na-
tional interest to exercise its prerogative to the extent that Koh and
others advocate. In particular, I am skeptical that "bad drafting," or
loose and ambiguous drafting, or very precise and specific drafting is an
accident. The legislative constraints found in some of the most impor-
tant framework legislation may not be as well defined as some commen-
tators - and some legislators - would like. However, that is not
because ofbad drafting, "loopholes," or executive perfidy. If executive
9. Pp. 68-70.
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-05 (1982).
11. P. 112.
12. P. 117.
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action represents "a continuing pattern of evasion of Congressional re-
straint,"'13 it is because Congress prefers it that way.
The War Powers Resolution 14 is a good example. Enacted in the wake
of Watergate to restrain Presidential use of troops abroad for not more
than sixty days without congressional approval, the Resolution was re-
jected by the executive branch on constitutional grounds from the begin-
ning, so it seems dubious to count it as heavily as other attempts at
framework legislation that the President has accepted. Moreover, experi-
ence with the operation of the Resolution reflects its impotence as effec-
tive legislation. President Reagan used unilateral force in Grenada,
Lebanon and Libya without any serious effort at constraint by the Con-
gress. During the Persian Gulf intervention, it became clear that the
President had no intention of complying with the sixty day stricture.
Yet, after considerable discussion, Congress did not seek to halt the in-
tervention. By the time of the Panama invasion, a consensus seemed to
have developed that the War Powers Resolution was obsolete. The prin-
cipal reason is political. Congress and the public want the President to
use force, so long as it successfully projects the nation's status as a super-
power. Perhaps what is needed, given the criticism of President Bush for
not intervening quickly enough in Panama, is a War Powers Resolution
that prevents Congress from authorizing the President to conduct unpop-
ular wars.
Koh cites The National Security Act of 194715 as another failure in
framework legislation. The Act's language is oblique, but the intent to
authorize paramilitary actions does not seem to have been questioned
until the formation of the Church Committee.'6 The Committee's skepti-
cism seems unjustified given the record of the OSS. Moreover, immediate
subsequent practices, such as the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, and of
Arbenz in Guatemala, and the Bay of Pigs invasion may illuminate Con-
gress' intent. Congress certainly knew at the time about the Executive's
practical construction of the Act. In this light, Koh's basis for question-
ing whether covert operations were permitted by the 1947 act and his
assertion that "there seems little doubt that Congress expected such op-
erations to be tightly controlled by the President and the N.S.C."'17 seem
questionable. It seems equally plausible to surmise that Congress wanted
13. P. 122.
14. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982)).
15. Supra note 10.
16. Final Report of the Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations With Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book II, S.





the President to conduct such operations, secretly and successfully, with-
out engaging their own responsibility. If the President's policy seems
undesirable, then Congress could always step in and rescue the nation -
and the Executive - from its more egregious foreign policy misjudg-
ments, as Congress did in the case of the Reagan administration's ill-
conceived attempts to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
A third example offered by Professor Koh of executive arrogation of
power is the Presidential use of informal agreements in trade and arms
control, made without the formal participation of Congress or the Sen-
ate. For twenty years presidents, on their own authority, have negotiated
voluntary export restraints on steel and automobiles and have executed
arms control agreements like the SALT I extension, SALT II obser-
vance, and the Stockholm Declaration. Congress has accepted the re-
sults of such agreements without complaint. It would seem appropriate
to take account of this congressional acquiescence, rooted as it is in the
American political culture, in sketching the fabric of constitutional law.
Congressional acquiescence is often treated as implicit support for execu-
tive authority to perform these actions.
Koh also criticizes the abuse of delegated legislative power. Discuss-
ing the post-Vietnam/Watergate reforms such as IEEPA,18 the Trade
Act of 1974,19 the Export Administration Act of 197920 and the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976,21 he states that "this generation of statutes
[generally] created not only procedural constraints, but also substantial
fresh delegations of foreign-affairs authority. By the late 1980s, it had
become clear that the executive branch had successfully tapped many of
these broad new authorizations while paying only lip service to the ac-
companying procedural strictures."'22 Congress certainly recognizes the
need for quick action and hence the necessity for delegated power. Con-
gress also recognizes that even paying "lip service" to procedural re-
quirements can have an effect on substantive policy-making. More
importantly, these requirements create a public record and political ac-
countability, thus enhancing the effectiveness of congressional oversight.
It is true that the restraints are not as tight as they could be, but I
believe that Congress wants it that way. Koh correctly diagnoses the
political incentives that induce Congress not to overly bind executive ac-
tion - the tendency of Congress to deal with past problems, to respond
18. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982).
19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982).
20. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2413 (1982).
21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1982).
22. P. 46.
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to interest groups, and to be co-opted through the interconnections
among committees, executive agencies and constituencies. Koh laments
bad drafting but the real culprit is compromise. Congress is a delibera-
tive, collective body where the final product reflects many different,
sometimes inconsistent, considerations. Compromise, in such a context,
does not result in pure restraint because many members do not believe
that the Executive should be hampered. To the contrary, the dominant
view in Congress is that the President should be, almost always, free to
act..
As the author of an exhaustive study of recent congressional activism
has pointed out, "[t]he powers of the modem presidency clearly were not
wrested by self-seeking chief executives from a struggling but ultimately
yielding Congress in a series of constitutional coups d'etat. '23 Presiden-
tial power was accumulated pursuant to law, and by congressional initia-
tive.24 In addition to IEEPA, the Export Administration Act and
extensive trade legislation cited by Koh, Congress has also authorized
and funded a standing armed force of over two million men and women,
a vast intelligence bureaucracy, and dozens of agencies with thousands of
officials participating in all facets of international organization and activ-
ity. For the most part, having created the bureaucracies, Congress has
been content to let the Executive run them.
It does so for good reason. Congress is above all a political body. Its
members are practical politicians who see themselves as responsible for
the effective functioning of the government, in addition to being account-
able to their particular constituencies. Because of their role as national
statesmen, they recognize that many foreign policy problems are truly
national in scope and require that the nation speak with "one voice,"
which a legislative body cannot provide. Being practical politicians they
also understand that foreign policy decisions require compromises of
competing interests, and, often, trade-offs between regional or factional
constituencies are needed to promote the overall national interest. Most
fundamentally, the strictly political interests of Congress lead it to ex-
pect, and eventually defer to, Presidential leadership. Those interests in-
clude, most obviously, the desire to be reelected. To that end, a member
must advance special interests and also maintain a favorable public pos-
ture as an effective legislator and politician. Those interests inevitably
23. J. SuNDQuIsT, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 155 (1981). The re-
maining text in this section is adapted from, Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power,
supra note 4.
24. See generally C. RossrrER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (2d ed. 1960 & Introduction
(1987)); L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER (1975).
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dictate positions, for example, on trade and military programs, or on for-
eign aid to Greece and Israel.
But most foreign policy is far removed from immediate political con-
cerns. Politically, there is almost no advantage in having to take a posi-
tion, through a recorded vote, on pressing foreign policy questions with
no immediate implication for local constituencies and with uncertain
long-term consequences. To the contrary, it may be preferable to accept
Presidential leadership and preserve the ability to criticize policy deci-
sions when they become politically unpopular. Acquiescence here en-
ables Congressmen to take credit for popular decisions and to criticize,
while gathering helpful publicity and stature, those that go awry. Thus,
a member may see no advantage, for example, in taking a position on
Cambodia. Stopping communism may be popular, but if victory results
in advancing the fortunes of Pol Pot, it may not be so desirable. As Koh
points out, voting for a policy necessarily entails taking responsibility for
its failure.
In many cases, a critical mass of congressional members has simply been
unwilling to take responsibility for setting foreign policy, preferring to leave
the decision - and the blame - with the president. As Senator Fullbright
recalled, long before the mid-1970s, "[a] majority [of Congress] may have
wished to end the war [in Indochina], but less than a majority of the two
Houses were willing to take the responsibility for ending it."' 25
It may serve a member's political interest to let the President take the
heat for decisions that may be desirable in the overall national interest
but are unpopular in certain sectors. For example, voting for or against
retaliatory tariffs, like those imposed in response to the European Com-
munity's ban on hormone treated beef, may be politically awkward for
congressmen. Such tariffs will hurt some importers while helping some
farmers, but will also risk a general trade war that would hurt everyone.
Congress is subject to other obvious limitations in setting foreign pol-
icy, of which thoughtful members are certainly aware. Diplomacy re-
quires a long-term perspective while Congress tends to be influenced by
short-term interests. Congress often concentrates on narrow or immedi-
ate issues, dealing with broad problems as if a single factor should be of
determinative significance. Additionally, Congress acts through the
blunt instrument of legislation. Once a policy has been legislatively di-
rected, it remains in force until someone can overcome the inertia
preventing new legislative action. When a problem vacates the headlines,
25. P. 132.
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it may not be easy to get the legislature to focus on the significance of
changed circumstances.
Members also recognize that the executive branch can act quickly and
has access to expertise and secret information unavailable to Congress.
These classic justifications for Presidential power are less persuasive to-
day than they were in the 18th century, because of expanded congres-
sional staffs, regular travel abroad, greater access to information and the
effects of international interdependence generally. Nevertheless, the in-
formation/expertise gap must still induce members to be somewhat wary
of taking responsibility for matters the consequences of which they feel
less confident than of issues wholly domestic in nature.
III. The Counter-Assault on Behalf of Congress
Although Koh concludes that the Iran-Contra affair, viewed in the
perspective of other Presidential initiatives in the past two decades, adds
up to "a continuing pattern of evasion of congressional restraint, ' 26 his
recommendations point to incremental reform. He advocates new frame-
work legislation incorporating a number of specific reforms, some of
which have already been enacted. Koh's general objective seems uncon-
troversial (except perhaps to an unreflecting criminal defendant bent on
preserving his liberty):
Any charter legislation should aim, primarily, to reaffirm the core constitu-
tional notion of balanced institutional participation, not to encourage con-
gressional micromanagement or improvident judicial activism in foreign-
policy matters. Thus, any reform legislation should acknowledge the Exec-
utive's leading constitutional role in foreign affairs, at the same time as it
seeks to reduce the isolation that currently surrounds executive branch ac-
tivities, to enhance internal executive branch deliberations, and to increase
congressional-executive dialogue while foreign-policy objectives are being
set and initiatives implemented. The goal of the reform effort should be to
assign institutional responsibility by clarifying the legal and constitutional
framework within which foreign-policy decisions shall be made.27
This analysis is clearly correct and should be uncontroversial. That is not
to say that some lawyers or academics, seeking to justify a specific policy
objective, will not trot out the usual broad claims supported by ritualistic
invocations of Hamilton or Madison. But in the real world no one would
dispute that constitutional power is shared among the three branches of






Koh suggests that we discard the "vision" of Presidential power that
some commentators may divine from the Supreme Court's decision in
US. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,28 a vision he accuses the Burger court of
blessing. He correctly notes that Presidential lawyers often quote the
famous dictum of the case asserting inherent, sovereign powers in the
presidency. After a mysterious explanation of the passing of sovereignty
to the United States federal government, Justice Sutherland states that
"[t]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation ... he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it."'29
Sutherland expansively refers to "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations." '30
The language makes a nice quote for an executive branch brief, but it is
not very helpful in an analysis of the real issues and, as Koh points out, it
is woefully deficient as a "vision" of constitutional law. The dictum is
both incomplete and unnecessary to the decision in the case, although the
existence of some virtually exclusive Presidential power seems generally
accepted. In deciding the case, it was unnecessary to rest the decision on
inherent Presidential power because Congress had fully delegated ample
authority to the President to support the action taken. Neither Justice
Sutherland nor subsequent justices have sought to articulate the specific
content or scope of this power. Aside from the dicta, there is little addi-
tional authoritative material on the scope of this elusive power.
Koh suggests substituting a Youngstown vision for the Curtiss-Wright
vision, based on dictum from the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer 31 [steel seizure] case. In that case, Justice Jackson introduced a
framework for analysis that Justice Rehnquist has described as represent-
ing as much "analysis and common sense as there is in this area": 32
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these
circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth)
to personify the federal sovereignty.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
28. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29. Id. at 319.
30. Id. at 320.
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
32. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981).
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authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsi-
bility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the im-
peratives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter.
33
It may be the best attempt at analytic coherence to date, but it does not
provide much guidance in actually contested situations.
The Youngstown vision is not much more focused than the Curtiss-
Wright vision. Each case recognizes some inherent Presidential power,
but neither provides any guidance for articulating its scope. Koh credits
the Jackson analysis with an "unusual clarity with which it articulates
the concept of balanced insti~ltional participation that underlies the Na-
tional Security Constitution. ' 34 This vision recognizes that Congress
plays a role, and that when Congress authorizes Presidential action, or
acquiesces in it, Presidential foreign relations power is strong. But the
Jackson "vision" evaporates when it comes to determining what is within
the scope of that "lowest ebb" of Presidential power, where the Executive
acts against congressional will. We know from Youngstown that it does
not include seizing the nation's steel mills to solve a labor dispute, and
we know from Iran-Contra that it does not include lying to Congress.
But the rest is obscure and is not elucidated by "applying" the Jackson
"analysis."
When one attempts to articulate the content of the President's exclu-
sive foreign affairs power, the sources of law range from statements made
by the President, members of Congress and Supreme Court justices to
formal acts of Congress and particular assertions of Presidential author-
ity that went uncontested. The resulting "common law" is mixed, and
much depends on congressional acquiescence. Critics like Koh seem to
want to abolish acquiescence and to substitute express congressional ap-
proval or rejection. Hence Koh favors the idea of centralizing congres-
sional decision-making in foreign affairs through a smaller national
security-type committee, and using fast-track procedures to assure rapid
action without extraneous amendments. These proposals are good ideas.
Indeed, I would favor a procedure for regular executive-legislative con-






sultations, using leadership committees on both sides, meeting once a
week and covering the entire range of national security policy issues, in-
stead of Koh's program of ad hoc consultations on war powers. The
National Security Council (NSC) adviser could conduct sessions with a
consultative group such as that suggested by Koh, assuring the President
a second opinion while avoiding the barriers created by the need to call a
special meeting. I would also favor strengthening the role of the NSC
adviser, and, in that connection, would agree with Koh that the position
should be subject to Senate confirmation. These reforms would system-
ize and arguably facilitate congressional participation in the making of
foreign policy.
Along these lines, "centralizing Congressional procedures for deciding
whether particular substantive agreements should be ratified by treaty or
executive agreement, 35 might also be desirable. The decision has been
to date a Presidential prerogative. In light of the increased effects of for-
eign policy, especially economic policy, on domestic affairs, it is sensible
to move toward greater use of congressional-executive agreements. Such
a move would also be beneficial in the area of arms control. Some of the
political factors discussed earlier, however, may inhibit acceptance of the
Koh proposal. The Senate would surely resist.
The establishment of a congressional legal adviser would also be bene-
ficial, at least for the foreign affairs legal profession. The principled argu-
ment in its favor, however, is less persuasive. While some would argue
that more legislative procedures would contribute to the development of
the "rule of law," I am skeptical because most decisions at the margin in
this field are political decisions. Koh also seems to place excessive faith
in the mandatory effects of the "rule of law" approach in his other rec-
ommendations. For example, in suggesting that executive legal opinions
be submitted for review by congressional lawyers, he seems to assume
that participants render neutral, objective legal opinions reflecting a sin-
gle correct view of "the law." Koh obviously knows that most legal is-
sues, in the government as elsewhere, can be argued both ways, and that
most lawyers attempt to fashion legal advice to help clients achieve legiti-
mate objectives. It seems doubtful that more systematic exchanges of
legal opinions would make much difference in the grand legal scheme.
Nevertheless, it might inhibit the most egregious excesses of advocacy
and, in that light, would be a desirable development.3 6
35. P. 195.
36. Koh also proposes the establishment of an independent intelligence oversight adminis-
tration. That proposal seems to assume that there is a single, correct "bipartisan" policy that
can be agreed upon. Like the single "rule of law" assumption discussed earlier, this approach
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In addition to revitalizing the congressional role, Koh would also acti-
vate the judiciary. The courts have invoked numerous doctrines - lack
of standing, ripeness, political question - to avoid settling controversies
between the President and Congress. As Koh points out, the courts can
and do decide whether a "war" exists for purposes of determining cover-
age under an insurance policy, and could do so under the Constitution as
well. The consequences are somewhat different, however, and I suspect
that the courts would normally prefer to avoid assessing, for example, the
legality of the invasion of Panama for reasons similar to those that lead
Congress to defer to Presidential power in the first place. I also suspect
that if the courts did get into the foreign affairs law business, they would
greatly expand the explicit scope of Presidential power. I am not sure
that this would be a desirable result, and I know it is not what Koh has
in mind.
Two of Koh's proposals seem out of step with his general approach to
constitutional law as an evolving body of law consisting of many formal
and informal sources. He argues that the Byrd amendment 37 should be
applied mechanically across the board. The Byrd amendment was ap-
plied in ratification of the INF Treaty as a reaction to the untenable "re-
interpretation" of the ABM Treaty and the "Sofaer Doctrine" invented
to justify it. The Byrd amendment provided that the President can not
change an interpretation of the INF treaty adopted by the Executive at
the time of Senate action, without the consent of the Senate or the Con-
gress. It thus embodied a notion of "entrenched" meaning of legal norms
that is at odds with the normal development and adaption of law to
changed circumstances. It fails to permit executive reinterpretations,
with congressional acquiescence, to -take account of changed circum-
stances. Like the constitutional development that Koh so perceptively
describes, treaties evolve over time in informal and mysterious ways. A
Byrd amendment has no place in our modem foreign affairs
jurisprudence.
Finally, the idea of more congressional involvement in foreign affairs
has a populist - and popular - ring. Yet the underlying assumption is
untested. How would foreign policy be different toward China, the
USSR, Japan, Iran, and the Uruguay Round? Would it be better as a
result of congressional and judicial involvement, subjecting it to more
rules and procedures? Whose interests would be advanced and whose for-
seems unlikely to stand the test of events. What is the current bipartisan view of support for
rebels in Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Lithuania? The choices on these matters are
political choices. Reform should enhance political accountability, not obfuscate it.




feited? Those inquiries, however, would require another book, which has
not yet been written. I hope that it will soon be undertaken by a scholar
as thoughtful, careful and perceptive as Professor Koh.
